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Memories are thought to undergo an episodic-to-semantic transformation in the course of
their consolidation. We here test if repeated recall induces a similar semanticisation, and if
the resulting qualitative changes in memories can be measured using simple feature-specific
reaction time probes. Participants studied associations between verbs and object images, and
then repeatedly recalled the objects when cued with the verb, immediately and after a two-
day delay. Reaction times during immediate recall demonstrate that conceptual features are
accessed faster than perceptual features. Consistent with a semanticisation process, this
perceptual-conceptual gap significantly increases across the delay. A significantly smaller
perceptual-conceptual gap is found in the delayed recall data of a control group who
repeatedly studied the verb-object pairings on the first day, instead of actively recalling them.
Our findings suggest that wake recall and offline consolidation interact to transform mem-
ories over time, strengthening meaningful semantic information over perceptual detail.
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One powerful way to protect memories against forgetting isto recall them frequently. Decades of research on thetesting effect have shown such a protective effect, sug-
gesting that repeated remembering stabilizes newly acquired
information in memory1–6. It is unknown, however, whether all
aspects of memory equally benefit from active recall. The aim of
the present work was to investigate the qualitative changes in
memories that occur with time and repeated remembering. We
used feature-specific reaction time (RT) probes to measure such
changes in lab-based visual memories. Specifically, we expected to
observe a transformation along a detailed-episodic to gist-like-
semantic gradient, based on several strands of research indicating
that memories become “semanticised” in the process of their
stabilisation.
Dominant theories of the testing effect make the central
assumption that active recall engages conceptual-associative
networks more so than other practice techniques such as repe-
ated study7–9. The elaborative retrieval account suggests that
during recall, a conceptual relationship is established between
initially separate episodic elements to unify them into a coherent
memory9. Similarly, the mediator effectiveness hypothesis10 states
that testing promotes long-term retention by evoking mediator
representations, which are concepts that have meaningful overlap
with a memory cue and target7. Together, this work suggests that
remembering co-activates semantically related concepts, more
than restudy, and can thereby contribute to the long-term storage
of newly acquired memories by linking them to already estab-
lished, related concepts.
Other authors have made similar assumptions from a more
neurobiologically and computationally motivated perspective11,
drawing a parallel between the processes stabilizing memories via
online recall, and the processes thought to consolidate memories
via offline replay, including during sleep. In this online con-
solidation framework of the testing effect, active recall activates a
memory’s associative index in the hippocampus, together with the
neocortical nodes representing the various elements contained in
the memory. As a result of this simultaneous activation, links
between the active elements are strengthened12. Moreover, because
recall tends to be somewhat imprecise, more so than re-encoding,
activation spreads to associatively or conceptually related elements,
providing an opportunity to integrate the new memory with
related information. This presumed stabilization and integration is
strongly reminiscent of the hippocampal-neocortical dialogue
assumed to happen during sleep-dependent memory replay13,
resulting in the integration of new memories into existing rela-
tional knowledge, and the strengthening of conceptual/schematic
links between memories14. Critically, many consolidation theories
assume that this reorganization goes along with a “semanticisa-
tion” of memories, such that initially detail-rich episodic memories
become more gist-like and lose detailed representations over time
and with prolonged periods of consolidation15–18. Based on these
parallels between wake retrieval and offline consolidation, the
present study tested whether repeated recall specifically induces a
behaviourally measurable “semanticisation” that goes beyond the
effects that naturally occur over time.
In the human memory consolidation literature, much of the
empirical evidence for semanticisation comes from neuroimaging
studies showing a gradual shift in the engagement of hippo-
campus and neocortex during recent and remote recall, or studies
tracking representational changes in memories over time16,19.
Recent work even suggests that the neocortical changes that
accompany such shifts can occur rapidly, across repeated expo-
sures to episodic events on the same day20,21, and that these
changes are then further stabilized through subsequent periods of
sleep22. Behavioural studies, on the other hand, have largely relied
on scoring of autobiographical or other descriptive verbal
memory reports for central gist versus peripheral details, and
yielded robust evidence for a detail-to-gist gradient23,24. The
present study used a different approach, asking if semanticisation
via recall can be observed in RTs that specifically reflect the speed
with which participants can access higher-level conceptual and
lower-level perceptual features of visual object memories.
This method was recently introduced by Linde-Domingo
et al.25. They showed that when participants are retrieving visual
objects from memory, conceptual aspects (e.g., Does the recalled
image represent an animate or inanimate object?) are accessed
more rapidly than perceptual aspects (e.g., Does the recalled
image represent a photo or a drawing?). In sharp contrast, RTs
were consistently faster to perceptual than conceptual questions
when the image was physically presented on the screen. This flip
suggests that recalling a memory progresses in the opposite
direction from visual perception, reactivating the core meaning
first before back-propagating to sensory details. Such semantic
prioritisation is plausible considering that the hippocampus is
most directly and reciprocally connected with late sensory pro-
cessing areas assumed to represent abstract concepts26,27. Both
online retrieval and offline replay of hippocampus-dependent
memories can therefore be assumed to preferentially activate
conceptual features of a memory, and this prioritisation may over
time produce a semanticised memory compared with the one
originally encoded. With this background in mind, and an
adapted version of the described RT paradigm, we here investi-
gate whether repeated retrieval enhances the semanticisation of
memories over time compared to repeated study.
In this work, two groups of participants learn novel verb-object
pairings at the beginning of day 1 (Fig. 1), and then immediately
practice the associations six times overall. Subjects in the retrieval
group practice by actively recalling the object image from memory
when cued with the verb, and answering conceptual and perceptual
questions about the recalled object as fast as possible. Subjects in the
restudy group instead practice by re-encoding the intact verb-object
pairings, answering the conceptual or perceptual question while
seeing the object on the screen. All participants return to the lab 48
h later for a delayed cued recall test, where each verb-object pairing
is probed once more with a conceptual and a perceptual question.
Feature-specific RTs are used as a measure of accessibility to lower-
level perceptual or higher-level conceptual object features. We show
that the RT gap between perceptual and conceptual features
increases across the two-day delay, indicative of time-dependent
semanticisation, and that active retrieval plays a central role in this
presumed semanticisation. Dependency analyses also suggest that
object features are remembered and forgotten in a hierarchical
fashion, and that recall becomes more dependent on conceptual
object features over time.
Results
Semanticisation over time. Participants in the retrieval group (n=
49) immediately practiced the newly learned verb-object associations
via cued recall. They did so six times overall, in three pseudo-
randomized cycles that each contained one perceptual and one
conceptual feature probe. We first tested the retrieval group data for a
time-dependent semanticisation, assuming that memory recall
prioritises access to conceptual over perceptual features, and that this
prioritisation increases over the two days with increasing semantici-
sation. Importantly, we wanted to isolate the transformation of epi-
sodic memories that occurs purely with passage of time, as opposed
to the changes that occur already on the first day across the repeated
practice trials. Using feature-specific RTs, we thus compared the
memory representation at the end of day 1 (i.e., cycle 3), after
completed learning and practice, to the representation on day 2. We
expected an increased perceptual–conceptual RT gap on the delayed
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day 2 test, compared to the end of day 1. A 2 (recall cycle: end of day
1 vs day 2) by 2 (question type: conceptual vs perceptual) repeated
measures analysis of variances (rmANOVA) on the RT data of the
repeated retrieval group only (Fig. 2) showed a main effect of recall
cycle (F(1,48) = 71.44, p < 0.01) indicating slower responses on day 2
than day 1, and the main effect of question type (F(1,48)= 29.58, p <
0.01) with conceptual questions being consistently answered faster
than perceptual questions. Critical to our first main hypothesis, the
rmANOVA also revealed a significant interaction (F(1,48)= 19.87, p
< 0.01) between the two factors, indicating that the conceptual-over-
perceptual RT advantage changed across days. A posthoc power
analysis in G*Power revealed an effect size of d= 0.64 and a power
of 0.99 for the interaction effect. Average RTs confirmed that the
interaction was produced by an increasing perceptual–conceptual RT
gap from the end of day 1 (Mday1= 40 ms, SDday1= 194ms) to day 2
(Mday2= 290ms, SDday2= 359 ms), in line with the semanticisation
hypothesis. Note that the interaction is equally robust when using the
averaged day 1 RTs within participants (F(1,48= 20.11, p < 0.01),
rather than the cycle 3 data. Together, these results suggest that
semantic features preferentially benefit from the passage of time after
retrieval practice, in line with semanticisation.
We additionally tested whether the perceptual–conceptual gap
in the retrieval group already changed across cycles on day 1, in
line with a “fast consolidation” process11. A 3 (cycle: 1, 2, 3) by 2
(question type: conceptual or perceptual) repeated measures
ANOVA of the day 1 RTs (Fig. 2) revealed a significant main
effect of cycle (F(2,96)) = 102.44, p < 0.01), with participants
becoming faster over time, as well as a significant main effect of
question type (F(1,48) = 5.01, p= 0.03), with conceptual
questions being answered overall faster than perceptual ones,
generally replicating the results of Linde-Domingo et al. (2019).
However, the cycle by question type interaction was not
significant (F(2,96) = 0.42, p= 0.66), indicating that the
perceptual–conceptual gap did not change significantly across
practice cycles. The immediate recall data of this study thus
provide no behavioural evidence for a fast semanticisation.
Stronger semanticisation after repeated retrieval than restudy.
To test our second hypothesis, that repeated retrieval leads to a
stronger delayed perceptual–conceptual gap than repeated study,
we investigated the RT gap on the second testing day in both
groups. If semanticisation over time is enhanced by retrieval
practice, this should be reflected in a larger RT gap in the retrieval
group (n= 49) in contrast to the restudy group (n= 24). A 2
(practice condition: retrieval vs restudy) by 2 (question type:
conceptual vs perceptual) mixed ANOVA on the RTs of day 2
(Fig. 3) revealed no main effect of practice condition (F(1, 71) =
1.41; p= 0.24), and a main effect of question type (F(1, 71) =
16.92; p < 0.01) with overall shorter RTs for conceptual
than perceptual questions. As hypothesized, a significant interac-
tion was found between question type and practice condition (F(1,
71) = 5.21; p= 0.03). Our posthoc power analysis on the inter-
action effect revealed an effect size of d= 0.27 and a power of 0.99.
This interaction was due to an effect in the expected direction,
with a higher perceptual–conceptual difference in the repeated
retrieval group (Mretrieval= 290ms, SDretrieval= 359ms) than in
the restudy group (Mrestudy= 83ms, SDrestudy= 372ms), in line
with the interpretation that repeated retrieval leads to more pro-
nounced semanticisation than repeated study. Specifically, we
found that perceptual questions are answered only slightly faster
in the retrieval group (Mretrieval= 2.63 s, SDretrieval= 0.75 s) in
comparison to the restudy group (Mrestudy= 2.74 s, SDrestudy=
0.86 s). In contrast, conceptual RTs show a comparatively
stronger difference between repeated retrieval (Mretrieval= 2.34 s,
SDretrieval= 0.61 s) and restudy (Mrestudy= 2.66 s, SDrestudy=
0.84 s), suggesting that the interaction is mainly caused by faster
access to conceptual features in the retrieval group, in line with a
retrieval-induced semanticisation. A subsampling analysis con-
firmed that the differential RT gap is also robustly found when
equating the sample sizes of the retrieval and the restudy group
(see Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 1).
A replication of the reversed retrieval stream. Next, we analysed
the data of the first day to test if we could replicate a reversal of the
RT patterns between memory retrieval and visual exposure, con-
ceptually replicating the previous results25. Based on these findings,
we expected faster RTs to conceptual than perceptual questions (i.e. a
reverse stream) in the retrieval group that practiced the associations
via active recall (Fig. 2), and faster perceptual than conceptual RTs
(i.e., a forward stream) in the restudy group that practiced the
associations by visual re-exposure. We therefore performed a mixed 2































































































Fig. 1 Overview of stimuli and task. a Design of the stimuli. The 64 pictures used in any given participant were orthogonally split into 32 drawings and 32
photographs, out of which 16 were animate and 16 inanimate objects, respectively. Each object could thus be classified along a perceptual (photo/drawing,
blue) or conceptual (animate-inanimate, red) dimension. b One prototypical task block of the paradigm within the repeated retrieval/restudy group. Both
groups performed eight blocks, each starting with the encoding of eight novel verb-object associations. After a 20 s distractor task, each of the eight
associations was practiced twice in each of the three practice cycles, once with a conceptual, once with a perceptual question, and reaction times (RTs)
were measured on each of the overall six practice trials. The maximum response time in each practice cycle of the restudy group was set to the average
response time of the corresponding cycle in the retrieval group. After 48 h, participants returned to complete a final test, where again each association was
tested once with each of the two question types, with RTs being recorded, as indicated by the button press symbols. Finally, a written cued recall test was
performed. Stimuli depicted are chosen from the BOSS database (https://sites.google.com/site/bosstimuli/home 59, https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-sa/3.0/) and customized with free and open source GNU image manipulation software (www.gimp.org; see Linde-Domingo et al.25).
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conceptual vs perceptual) ANOVA on the day 1 data, averaging RTs
across the 3 cycles. Apart from a main effect of task (F(1,71) = 71.13,
p < 0.01), and no main effect of question type (F(1,71) < 0.01, p=
0.98), this analysis revealed the expected, significant cross-over
interaction (F(1,71) = 9.24, p < 0.01) with faster responses for per-
ceptual questions than conceptual ones in restudy (Mper= 1.13 s,
SDper= 0.21 s; Mcon= 1.19 s, SDcon= 0.19 s) and vice versa in
retrieval (Mper= 1.95 s, SDper= 0.42 s;Mcon= 1.89 s, SDcon= 0.44 s).
Hierarchical relationship between remembered features. Two
further analyses were conducted on accuracy data, rather than
RTs. First, we investigated a possible hierarchical dependency
between perceptual and conceptual features as shown in recent
work28 and how this relationship changed over time. All correct
and incorrect recall trials with a response time above 200ms were
sorted into four categories, depending on whether participants
remembered both features, only perceptual features, only con-
ceptual features or none. In line with previous work28,29, we
expected that over time, the majority of items would be forgotten
in a holistic manner, such that items that were fully remembered
(“both features correct”) on day 1 would be fully forgotten (“none
correct”) on day 2. For the present purpose, we were however
particularly interested in the two response categories indicating
partial remembering (i.e., “conceptual only” and “perceptual
only” recall trials). Here, a hierarchical dependence in a reverse
memory reconstruction stream predicts a particular pattern:
higher-level conceptual information would need to be accessed
before the lower-level perceptual information can be reached. As
a result, participants should be relatively likely to remember the
conceptual feature (“Was it animate or inanimate”) while for-
getting the perceptual one (“Was it a photo or drawing”), but
there should be very few trials where they remember the per-
ceptual while forgetting the conceptual feature, except for random
guesses. We thus expected to see a significant difference in the
number of responses falling into these two categories already on
the immediate day 1 recall. If semanticisation increases this
hierarchical dependency, the gap in the proportion of conceptual-
only and perceptual-only recalls should significantly increase
across the 2-day delay.
We carried out a 2 (recall cycle: end of day 1 vs day 2) by 2
(features remembered: conceptual-only vs perceptual-only)
rmANOVA to test this hypothesis. This analysis revealed a main
effect of repetition (F(1,48) = 53.97, p < 0.01), and a main effect
of features remembered (F(1,48) = 27.10, p < 0.01), the latter
effect in line with hierarchical recall. Importantly, we also found
the expected significant interaction (F(1,48) = 8.21, p < 0.01),
reflecting the observation that over time, the number of objects
for which the conceptual but not the perceptual feature could be
remembered increased significantly more than the number of
objects for which the opposite pattern was true (Fig. 4). The
interaction is equally robust when using the averaged day 1
accuracies (F(1,48) = 14.31, p < 0.01), rather than the cycle 3 data.
Note that the data presented in Fig. 4 is not corrected for
estimated random guesses28, as such a correction would have
turned most proportions negative, and therefore seemed to be an
overestimation of guesses in our dataset. However, since the
guesses of a particular cycle are assumed to be distributed equally
across response categories within that cycle, correcting does not
change the outcomes of the statistical analysis (corrected
repetition effect F(1,48) = 55.52, p < 0.01), corrected features
remembered effect (F(1,48) = 27.10, p < 0.01), and corrected
interaction (F(1,48) = 8.21, p < 0.01)). Again, the interaction was
also significant when comparing the average day 1 data to day 2
(F(1,48) = 14.31, p < 0.01).
A replication of the testing effect. Finally, we also assessed the
written cued recall responses on the second day to investigate if a
general testing effect was found in our sample. To do so, we com-





















Perceptual-conceptual gap in each group
Retrieval
Restudy
Fig. 3 Perceptual-conceptual reaction time (RT) gap in each group on day
2. Repeated retrieval yields a stronger perceptual–conceptual RT gap than
restudy on the delayed test (two-sided t(71) = 2.28, p= 0.03, CI= [0.03,
0.39]). Perceptual-conceptual RT gaps are depicted for retrieval and
restudy on day 2. Filled circles represent the overall mean, boxplots
represent median and 25th and 75th percentiles; whiskers represent 2nd
and 98th percentile; dots represent the means of individual subjects. Dark
grey represents retrieval data, light grey represents restudy data. N= 49
independent subjects in the retrieval group, n= 24 independent subjects in














Repeated retrieval RTs to each question
Perceptual
Conceptual
Fig. 2 Retrieval reaction times (RTs), separate by question and
repetition. The gap between perceptual and conceptual RTs significantly
increases from day 1 to day 2 (interaction between question type and
repetition (F(1,48) = 19.87, p= 0.00, d= 0.64)), in line with a
semanticisation process over time. RTs in the repeated retrieval group are
depicted for each cycle and question type. Filled circles represent the
overall mean, boxplots represent median and 25th and 75th percentiles;
whiskers represent 2nd and 98th percentile; dots represent the means of
individual subjects. Blue represents perceptual, red conceptual responses.
N= 49 independent subjects. Source data are provided as a Source
Data file.
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experimental groups, using two independent sample t-tests. All
written responses were categorized by two experimenters as “specific
correct/incorrect” and “coarse correct/incorrect” responses. Here,
specific correct includes retrieving the exact object label (e.g., parrot),
whereas coarse correct responses also include correct descriptions of
the object’s category (such as “colourful bird” for “parrot”). Two-
sided t-tests revealed that participants in the repeated retrieval group
(Mcoarse= 0.30, SDcoarse= 0.19; Mspecific= 0.25, SDspecific= 0.18)
recalled significantly more associations than restudy participants
(Mcoarse= 0.20, SDcoarse= 0.18; Mspecific= 0.16, SDspecific= 0.17)
using either scoring scheme, specific (t(71) = 2.06, p= 0.04, CI=
[0.00, 0.17]) and coarse (t(71)= 2.16, p= 0.03, CI= [0.01, 0.19]; see
Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 1).
We were then interested whether the paper-and-pencil based
cued recall performance was related to the size of the
perceptual–conceptual gap in feature-specific RT probes. We
thus tested whether, within participants, those items for which
delayed memory performance is strong enough to support cued
recall on the final sheet test show a larger RT gap. To do so, all
RTs of day 2 were compared between trials where the
corresponding object was remembered on the response sheets
(specific/coarse correct), and those where the object was not
remembered (specific/coarse incorrect). Results show that
the perceptual–conceptual RT gap is significantly larger for
correctly than for incorrectly recalled items (t(71) = 2.13, p=
0.04, CI= [0.01, 0.33] with the specific scoring approach, t(71) =
2.65, p= 0.01, CI= [0.05, 0.38] with the coarse scoring
approach). Decomposing these differences in more detail, we
found similar perceptual RTs for correct and incorrect sheet
responses (for coarse scoring: Mper_corr= 2.54 s, SDper_corr=
0.87 s, Mper_incorr= 2.52 s, SDper_incorr= 0.97 s; for specific scor-
ing: Mper_corr= 2.50 s, SDper_corr= 0.68 s, Mper_incorr= 2.52 s,
SDper_incorr= 0.97 s) whereas the conceptual RTs for correct
sheet responses (coarse scoring: Mcon_corr= 2.23 s, SDcon_corr=
0.59 s; specific scoring: Mcon_corr= 2.20 s, SDcon_corr= 0.62 s)
are faster than those for incorrect sheet responses (coarse
scoring: Mcon_incorr= 2.42 s, SDcon_incorr= 0.93 s; specific scoring:
Mcon_incorr= 2.40 s, SDcon_incorr= 0.89 s). In contrast to the differ-
ence between correct and incorrect perceptual RTs (t(71) = 0.03,
p= 0.98, CI= [−0.19, 0.19]), the difference between conceptual
RTs for correct and incorrect sheet responses is significant with
the coarse scoring method (t(71) = −2.49, p= 0.02, CI= [−0.38,
−0.04]) and thus seems to drive the changed RT gap on day 2
(the specific scoring method did not yield a significant difference
for neither feature; t(71) = –0.22, p= 0.83, CI= [−0.21, 0.17] for
perceptual; t(71) = −1.95, p= 0.06, CI= [−0.39, 0.00] for
conceptual questions; Fig. 5). Again, these findings suggest that
items for which a strong episodic trace exists show a larger RT
gap, caused by relatively faster access to conceptual item features.
Note that we found a mirrored effect for accuracies, such that
participants who performed better on the paper-and-pencil test
showed a larger accuracy gap in the button presses, when splitting
according to specific (t(71) = 3.08, p < 0.01, CI= [0.03, 0.15]) and
the coarse (t(71) = 3.95, p < 0.01, CI= [0.05, 0.16]) scoring
method (Supplementary Fig. 2).
Discussion
Do memories change every time we remember them?
Cognitive10,30 and neurobiologically motivated11 theories assume
that each active recall constitutes a distinct online consolidation
event that systematically changes the nature of the memory, from
an initially detail-rich episode to a “semanticised” version of the
same event. Two questions were of central interest in the present
study. First, we wanted to test if feature-specific probes can be
used to reveal this presumed perceptual-to-conceptual transfor-
mation (semanticisation) of memories over an initial period of
consolidation. Second, we were interested if repeated remem-
bering specifically boosts this transformation compared with
repeated study, preserving conceptual information relatively more
over time.
To test our first hypothesis of a semanticisation over time, we
measured how fast participants were able to recall perceptual and
conceptual features of previously memorised objects on the first
day, compared with how fast they accessed the same features 48 h
later. While conceptual information was consistently accessed
faster on the immediate and the delayed memory test, the
perceptual–conceptual gap significantly increased over the two-
day retention period, suggesting that access to conceptual mem-
ory features was favoured over access to perceptual features across
the temporal delay. This finding is consistent with at least two
possible interpretations. High-level semantic information may be
prioritised for active consolidation, an ongoing discussion in the
consolidation literature16,31. Or semantic information might be
forgotten at a slower rate than perceptual information, a possi-
bility we return to further below. As also elaborated below,
hierarchical forgetting and prioritisation for active consolidation
may in fact rely on the same underlying mechanism.
Recent studies do support an active and selective consolidation
view. For example, structured, categorical information shows
above-baseline enhancement from sleep, compared with detailed,
stimulus-unique features of the memorized stimuli32. It has thus
been suggested that structured information is subject to active
consolidation. In terms of functional anatomy, the hippocampus
is most directly connected with late sensory areas coding abstract-
semantic features of objects26,27. Moreover, concept cells in the
hippocampus are thought to form the building blocks of episodic
memories33. The elements (e.g., objects, people) that constitute an
episode are thus likely bound together on the level of meaningful
semantic units. During retrieval and offline replay, it is assumed


















None correctPerceptual onlyConceptual onlyBoth correct
Remembered object features per cycle
Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Fig. 4 Remembered and forgotten object features, separate for cycles 3
and 4. The data show a hierarchical dependency between conceptual and
perceptual memory features that increases over time (interaction between
feature remembered and cycle F(1,48) = 8.21, p= 0.01, d= 0.41). The
average number of objects in each response-category for cycle 3 (end of
day 1) and cycle 4 (day 2) of all subjects in the repeated retrieval group are
shown. Filled circles represent the overall mean, boxplots represent median
and 25th and 75th percentiles; whiskers represent 2nd and 98th percentile;
dots represent the means of individual subjects. Dark grey represents cycle
3, light grey represents cycle 4. N= 49 independent subjects. Source data
are provided as a Source Data file.
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-23288-5 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2021) 12:3177 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-23288-5 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 5
reactivated in a cascade that starts with pattern completion in the
hippocampus, followed by a back-propagation into
neocortex34–36. This back-propagation likely starts off with the
information coded closest to the hippocampus, and then pro-
gresses backwards along the neocortical hierarchy25. The pre-
sumed hippocampal-neocortical dialogue during wake retrieval
and sleep might thus prioritise conceptual features of the reacti-
vated memories, relative to their perceptual features that are
coded in brain areas further removed from the hippocampus. As
a result, each replay event would strengthen semantic information
more than perceptual, further exaggerating the gap that is already
present on the immediate recall.
Alternatively, it is possible that the perceptual features of our
visual objects were forgotten faster than their conceptual features.
The nature of item-based forgetting is still under debate37. Some
recent work suggests that the forgetting of perceptual features,
such as colour, is independent of, and occurs faster than, for-
getting of higher-level conceptual features such as item state or
exemplar38,39. In contrast, other research has shown that object
memories are forgotten in a more holistic manner, with an
interesting hierarchically dependent forgetting of perceptual and
conceptual features28. Inspired by this work, we investigated a
possible hierarchical dependency of forgetting in our own accu-
racy patterns. We indeed saw evidence for asymmetrical recall,
such that if participants only recalled one of the two features, they
were more likely to remember the conceptual but not the per-
ceptual feature than vice versa. This asymmetry significantly
increased over the two-day delay, again indicating an increasing
dependence of remembering on conceptual features. Together
with the RT results, our findings therefore support a view of
hierarchically dependent remembering and forgetting of single
item features, with lower-level perceptual features having a higher
likelihood of being forgotten independently of higher-level
semantic features.
To distinguish the contribution of active retrieval to such time-
dependent consolidation effects, we further tested whether
retrieval on the first day enhances the preservation of conceptual
features more than restudy, a more visual type of practice that
does not involve the same degree of intrinsic memory
reactivation. In line with our second main hypothesis, we found a
larger perceptual–conceptual RT gap on the second day in the
retrieval group. Average RTs indicate that this change is driven by
a pronounced gain in conceptual feature access after repeated
retrieval compared to restudy, rather than differences in how fast
the two groups access the perceptual details of the stimuli. This
pattern of results suggests that the underlying semanticisation
process is relatively stronger when the originally learned asso-
ciations are immediately practiced by active cued recall, and it has
at least two important implications.
First, our finding has implications for theories of the testing
effect, showing that active recall disproportionally increases the
access to conceptual aspects of memory over perceptual aspects.
This finding resonates with the idea that each memory recall
tends to co-activate semantically related information40, in turn
facilitating the integration of newly learned information into
existing knowledge networks10,30. In the long-term, such
knowledge integration can then aid memory recall, as supported
by the close relationship we found between paper-and-pencil
accuracy and the RT gap on day two, such that participants with
good episodic recall tend to show larger differences between
perceptual and conceptual feature access on the delayed tests.
Semanticisation thus seems to support episodic recall on delayed
tests and is boosted by retrieval practice.
Second, our results suggest that repeated remembering could
be an important factor for representational memory changes that
interact with a subsequent period of sleep (see also Cairney
et al.41). Many sleep studies carry out a memory test before and
after sleep to obtain a difference score within subjects42, and it is
thus important to distinguish retrieval’s specific contribution to
the observed consolidation effects. While the present study sug-
gests that repeated recall can amplify time-dependent, qualitative
changes in memories, we did not manipulate whether the
retrieval was followed by a period of wake or sleep, and our
results can therefore not directly address the interaction between
retrieval practice and sleep. One recent study found that sleep’s
benefits were indeed reduced when preceded by retrieval com-
pared to restudy practice43. These results, however, were inter-
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Fig. 5 Perceptual and conceptual reaction times (RTs) for (in)correct specific and coarse written cued recall responses on day 2. Only associations that
are remembered in the cued recall test yield a perceptual–conceptual reaction time gap in the task (two-sided test for the gap difference between correctly
and incorrectly remembered associations: t(71) = 2.13, p= 0.04, CI= [0.01, 0.33] with the specific scoring approach, two-sided t(71) = 2.65, p= 0.01,
CI= [0.05, 0.38] with the coarse scoring approach). Perceptual and conceptual RTs are shown as categorized in correct and incorrect specific (a)/coarse
(b) sheet responses. Filled circles represent the overall mean, boxplots represent median and 25th and 75th percentiles; whiskers represent 2nd and 98th
percentile; dots represent the means of individual subjects. Blue represents perceptual, red conceptual responses. N= 73 independent subjects. Source
data are provided as a Source Data file.
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up to a point where they no longer benefit from sleep43, an
interpretation that is well in line with other reports that sleep
prioritizes, or at least has a more measurable effect on, weaker
memories44,45. In such cases, more sensitive tests like our feature-
specific RT probes, or test conditions with higher demands (e.g.
on interference control) can still be used to successfully uncover
consolidation effects44. In future studies, sensitivity and the
timing of tests will certainly play an important role in disen-
tangling the differential contributions of repeated remembering
and sleep to the long-term retention of memories.
Our findings support the idea that active testing, in terms of the
neurobiological processes involved, mimics consolidation by
relaying newly acquired information from hippocampal to neo-
cortical structures11. However, the perceptual–conceptual gap in
the retrieval group did not change with repeated remembering on
day 1, and our results do thus not provide evidence for a “fast”
consolidation11 process. A very similar finding was recently
reported in a study investigating qualitative changes in memory-
specific, multivariate neural patterns during recall46. In contrast,
recent neuroimaging studies report that functional and neuro-
plastic changes can occur within a single session of rehearsal20,21,
speaking in favour of a fast consolidation process. Why then do
the behavioural, feature-specific changes not become visible on a
more rapid timescale, when the neurobiological changes pre-
sumably take place? After initial learning and practice, hippo-
campal and neocortical memory traces likely co-exist, with the
hippocampus dominating immediate recall. Delayed recall has
been shown to depend more strongly on neocortex42,46,47, in line
with most consolidation theories17,48–50. Moreover, imaging work
suggests that the rapid neurophysiological markers of plasticity
may require a large number of, and more spaced, repetitions to
evolve20,21, plus a further period of consolidation to become
stabilised22. Retrieval practice might thus help to establish a
neocortical trace rapidly, more so than restudy, but this trace will
only become behaviourally relevant at longer delays, when
remembering is more dependent on neocortex.
The present findings suggest that RTs, paired with questions
that differentially probe access to specific mnemonic features, are
sensitive to the presumed time- and recall-dependent transfor-
mation of relatively simple, visual-associative memories. Our
feature-specific RT method thus lends itself well to testing for
qualitative changes of practice and sleep on memory, and it
complements other approaches that are commonly used. These
include the scoring of autobiographical memories according to
how much gist or detailed information subjects report (e.g. used
in recent work23); recognition-based measures using familiarity as
a proxy for gist, and recollection as a proxy for detail51; and more
recently, measures of access and precision52,53. RTs are rarely
used in memory studies. Object recognition work, however,
shows that the speed with which participants can categorize
objects (e.g., animate/inanimate) is well aligned with the time
points when the same categories can be decoded from brain
activity54,55, and a recent study tracked the back-propagation of
information during memory recall using such feature-specific
RTs25. The present results indicate that differential RTs can
directly tap into the qualitative changes that occur over the course
of memory consolidation.
We have framed these changes as reflecting a transition along a
perceptual-to-conceptual gradient, whereas the primary termi-
nology in the consolidation literature is that of an episodic-to-
semantic transition56,57. These gradients are clearly overlapping
in our paradigm, where answering the perceptual questions
requires more vivid and detailed recollection than answering the
conceptual questions. Moreover, semantic features (e.g. that a dog
is animate) are inherent in an object’s identity, whereas our
perceptual features are random bindings, and retrieving them
should thus strongly engage episodic-associative memory pro-
cesses. Having said that, if our RT task primarily measured an
episodic-semantic distinction, we would expect to see that par-
ticipants with good episodic memory show very fast RTs to
perceptual questions, diminishing the RT gap to conceptual
questions. Contrary to this prediction, we found that better
memory accuracy (based on the paper-and-pencil cued recall test)
was related to a larger RT gap, and to faster RTs for conceptual
features in particular. Access to the episodic trace does therefore
not seem to scale with access to the perceptual features, even
though the two processes are certainly not independent. We
instead argue that feature-specific RTs reflect the neocortical
back-propagation process that follows initial access to the epi-
sodic trace25.
In summary, using feature-specific probes, we provide evidence
for the semanticisation of memories over time and specifically
with repeated remembering. Our main results are consistent with
a framework where the natural prioritisation of conceptual
information during repeated retrieval25 has a lasting effect on
what is being retained over time. We reconcile cognitive theories
of the testing effect with neurobiologically motivated theories of
memory retrieval, which posit that functional anatomy during
retrieval dictates faster access to later, more abstract-conceptual
stages of visual processing. Finally, our feature-specific RT probes
provide a simple way to assess the qualitative changes of mne-
monic representations over time, and might thus be useful for
future consolidation studies using lab-based rather than auto-
biographical memories.
Methods
Participants and a priori power calculations. Previously published work has
found an effect size of d= 0.55 for the perceptual–conceptual gap in RTs during
retrieval25. We expected an effect size at least as large on day 2 in the repeated
retrieval group. A power analysis in G*Power58 with d= 0.55, α= 0.05 and a
power of 0.9 suggested that a sample size of at least 30 was required to detect an
existing effect in the retrieval group. The effect of most interest in the retrieval
group was a significant interaction between testing day and question type, speci-
fically such that the gap between conceptual and perceptual RTs would significantly
increase from day 1 to day 2. The power for this interaction contrast could not be
estimated a priori from the work of Linde-Domingo et al.25. To have sufficient
power to detect an increase in the perceptual–conceptual gap, we decided to double
their sample size, aiming for 48 subjects in the retrieval group (see results section
for corresponding posthoc power analyses).
The second comparison of interest in this study was a contrast between the
perceptual–conceptual gap on day 2 (i.e., delayed test) in the retrieval and the
restudy groups. Again, since the effect size could not be estimated directly from
previous work, we aimed for n= 24 participants in the restudy group based on
(Linde-Domingo et al.25) using n= 24 within multiple groups to do between group
comparisons. We thus aimed for a sample size of n= 72 overall for the critical
comparison of the retrieval and the restudy group. Posthoc power analyses can be
found in the results section.
Fifty-seven healthy volunteers from the local student population in Birmingham
participated in the retrieval condition (45 female and 12 male, mean age [Mage]=
19.95, standard deviation [SDage]= 0.79), of which eight were excluded due to
absence on the second testing day or missing data. Another 26 volunteers
participated in the restudy group (21 female and 5 male, Mage= 18.92, SDage=
0.89), of which two were excluded due to absence on the second testing day. Our
final sample thus consisted of 49 participants in the retrieval group and another 24
participants in the restudy group. All participants were informed about the
experimental procedure, underwent a screening questionnaire (including sleep and
consumption behaviour 24 h before the experiment) and gave their written
informed consent. The research was approved by the STEM ethics committee of
the University of Birmingham.
Material. The paradigm was an adapted version of the visual verb-object association
task designed by Linde-Domingo et al.25. Our stimulus materials consisted of 64
action verbs and 128 pictures of everyday objects, all presented on white backgrounds
(see Fig. 1.a and the previous work25 for more detailed information about the source
and manipulation of pictures25 (BOSS database, www.gimp.org 59) and verbs).
Importantly, objects were categorized into two conceptual classes, i.e. animate vs
inanimate objects; and two perceptual classes, i.e. black line drawings vs coloured
photographs. We pseudo-randomly drew 64 images per participant according to a
fully balanced scheme, such that each of the two-by-two categories included the same
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number of pictures (16 animate-photographs, 16 animate -drawings, 16 inanimate-
photographs, 16 inanimate-drawings). Action verbs were randomly assigned to
images in each participant, and were presented together with pictures centrally
overlaid on a white background. The stimulus presentation and timing and accuracy
information collection were controlled by scripts written in Matlab 2017a (www.
mathworks.com) and the Psychophysics Toolbox Version 360–62.
For the analysis we used customized Matlab code (https://www.mathworks.
com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/64980-simple-rm-mixed-anova-for-any-design 63;
https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/6874-two-way-repeated-
measures-anova 64), G*power 3.158. Figures were created using the raincloud plots
Version 1.165,66, ColorBrewer 2.0 (from www.ColorBrewer.org by Cynthia A.
Brewer, Geography, Pennsylvania State University) and colorbrewer schemes 2.0
for Matlab (https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/34087-
cbrewer-colorbrewer-schemes-for-matlab)67 and the Inkscape 1.0.1 (https://
inkscape.org/).
Procedure overview. In both experimental groups, participants were informed
about the experimental procedure, asked to sign an informed consent form and to
perform a training run. After completion of this training, participants continued to
the experimental task (Fig. 1b). On day 1, participants performed eight task blocks,
each including an encoding block with eight trials, a 20 s distractor task and three
practice cycles, each including two times eight practice trials. Returning after 48 h,
participants finished the experiment with a final test consisting of a single retrieval
cycle (see below for details). Before leaving, participants completed a written cued
recall test. Participants in both experimental groups had been clearly and repeat-
edly informed about the final recall on test day 2 before carrying out the task on
test day 1. It took participants about 70 min to perform the task on day 1, and
about 20 min on day 2.
Encoding. In each encoding block (Fig. 1b), participants were instructed to study 8
novel verb-object pairings. A fixation cross was presented to the participants for a
jittered time period between 500 and 1500 ms. An action verb was then presented
for 1500 ms before an object was shown for a maximum time period of 7 s. To
facilitate learning, participants were instructed to form a vivid visual mental image
using the verb-object pairing. Once they had formed a strong mental image, par-
ticipants were asked to press the up-arrow key, which moved the presentation on to
the next trial. In the repeated retrieval group, it took participants 4.65 s on average,
and in the restudy group it took them 4.34 s to proceed to the next trial (SDretrieval
= 1.77; SDrestudy= 1.65).
Distractor. After each encoding block, participants performed a self-paced dis-
tractor task for 20 s, indicating as fast as possible whether each of the consecutively
presented numbers on the screen was odd or even, using a left/right key press.
Feedback on the percentage of correct responses was provided at the end of each
distractor phase.
Practice
Repeated retrieval group. The retrieval trials started with the presentation of a fixation
cross, jittered between 500 and 1500ms, and followed by the conceptual (animate/
inanimate) or perceptual (photo/drawing) question that was displayed for 3 s,
enabling participants to mentally prepare to recall the respective feature of the object
that was relevant on a given trial. The verb was then displayed above the response
alternatives (e.g., animate/inanimate), and participants had to retrieve the associated
object and answer the question as fast as possible. Verb and question were displayed
for a maximum period of 10 s or until the participant selected a response to the
question. The questions were answered with left, downward and right-arrow keys.
Restudy group. In the restudy group, the paradigm was kept as similar to the
repeated retrieval group as possible, including an attempt to equate average
exposure times during practice (for which reason the restudy group data were
collected after the retrieval group). The restudy trial was initiated with a fixation
cross with the same jitter (500–1500 ms) as in the retrieval group, and followed by
the conceptual or perceptual question that was displayed for 3 s. The verb cue and
object then appeared together above the question. Again, participants were asked to
use the 3 s period to prepare mentally to answer the question. When the object
appeared, participants were instructed to first answer the question about the object
they saw on the screen as fast as possible, and then use the remaining time to
restudy the verb-object pair. In order to equate exposure times between the two
groups, we set the trial duration of each of the three restudy cycles to the average
response time of each of the three individual retrieval cycles from the previously
collected retrieval group (cycle 1: 2.2 s, cycle 2: 1.9 s, cycle 3: 1.8 s).
Retrieval and restudy blocks setup. Participants of both groups completed three
consecutive practice cycles, in each of which they practiced all eight verb-object
associations they had learned in the previous encoding block twice, once answering
a conceptual and once answering a perceptual question. This sums up to six
practice trials per learned association, three with each question type. The order of
the conceptual and perceptual questions within cycles was counterbalanced as
follows: In each of the three cycles, one half of the stimuli was first probed with a
conceptual question and the other half with a perceptual question first. In addition,
we controlled that each of the eight question-order possibilities occurred equally
often for each object type (i.e., animate-photo, animate-drawing, inanimate-photo,
inanimate-drawing). The percentage of correct trials was provided after the third
practice cycle.
Final test. After 48 h, participants were asked to complete a final test, in which
they performed one cued recall block with the same procedural set-up as on day 1
in the retrieval group. Participants were presented with a conceptual/perceptual
probe, and asked to answer this question as fast as possible when cued with a verb.
Each object was recalled once with each question type. Here, half of the stimuli was
first probed with a conceptual question and the other half with a perceptual
question, randomized independently with respect to the first testing day. Finally,
participants were given a paper sheet, displaying all 64 action verbs, next to which
they were asked to write down a verbal description of the associated object.
Data preparation. During data preparation, all RTs faster than 200 ms were
excluded from the study. For the main analyses, RTs of correct trials were averaged
and the standard deviation was calculated for both conceptual and perceptual
questions, separately for the retrieval and the restudy group, and separately for the
trials of each individual practice cycle per subject. Trials exceeding the average RT
of a given cycle by more than three times the standard deviation were excluded in
further RT analyses25. In the repeated retrieval group, 98.16% of the data remained
after trimming the RTs of correct responses, whereas in the restudy group, 99.60%
remained for our main analyses. Testing for a relationship between day 2 RTs and
sheet responses, the RTs we used included correct, incorrect, and “don’t remember”
button press responses and trials exceeding the average RT of the given cycle by
more than three times the standard deviation were excluded after the categoriza-
tion of RTs.
To prepare the accuracy data, trials with responses faster than 200 ms, and
objects with a missing response for either of both questions on one cycle were
excluded in the related cycle. After this accuracy trimming, 99.39% of the repeated
retrieval data and 93.26% of the restudy data remained. The RT data prepared for
our main hypotheses met the normality assumptions.
Analysis. To assess our main hypotheses of interest, including RT differences over
time and between groups, we performed repeated measures (rm) ANOVAs on the
RTs. Testing for a semanticisation over time, we included cycles (cycle 3, cycle 4)
and question type (perceptual, conceptual) as within-subjects factors. Control
analyses were added that used the averaged day 1 data instead of cycle 3, such that
the relevant factors were day (day 1, day 2) and question type (perceptual, con-
ceptual). Exploring the RT gap between groups on day 2, we used question type
(perceptual, conceptual) as within-subjects factor and group (retrieval, restudy) as
between-subjects factor. To replicate a reversed stream, we again used an rmA-
NOVA with question type as within-, and group as between-subjects factor.
Additional rmANOVAs were carried out on accuracies to test for dependency
between two features. Here, we used cycles and question types as within-subject
factors. For posthoc analyses, we performed two-sided T-tests. Two-sided T-tests
were also used on sheet response accuracies, to demonstrate a testing effect. Finally,
two-sided T-tests were performed on RT gaps and task accuracies categorized
according to sheet accuracies.
Statistics and reproducibility. Our methods and statistical results, especially the
retrieval group results from day 1, reproduce and extend findings from one other
study by Linde-Domingo et al.25.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The retrieval and restudy data files that support the findings of this study can be
downloaded from the “Retrieval_group” and “Restudy_group” folders respectively,
hosted on the Open Science Framework under the identifier https://doi.org/10.17605/
OSF.IO/WP4FU 68. Stimulus material can be found in the BOSS database (https://sites.
google.com/site/bosstimuli/home 59). Source data are provided with this paper.
Code availability
The custom code used in this study is available on the Open Science Framework with the
identifier https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/WP4FU 68. Source data are provided with
this paper.
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